In this paper, the authors review and update an approach to the design of ethical robots based on a simulation-based internal model, in which the ethical robot's reasoning is both transparent and verifiable. To prove the principles of our approach, we use a case study implementation to experimentally demonstrate its operation. Importantly, it is the first such robot controller where the ethical machine reasoning has been formally verified. 
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N
Robots are increasingly autonomous; semi-autonomous flying robots are commercially available; and driverless cars are undergoing real-world tests [1] . This trend is expected to continue [2] . Such systems have expanding abilities for making unsupervised decisions. This makes it imperative both that the robotic systems are capable of taking human ethical values 1 into account when they make decisions, and that mechanisms are in place to guarantee that the behavior executed by the robot that respects those values. A particularly important value, and one at the forefront of many people's minds when considering robotic systems that will interact closely with humans is the question "is it safe?"-highlighting the importance of mechanisms for guaranteeing safety [3] , [4] . However, many other ethical considerations, such as human free will, privacy, and dignity, also come into play when considering autonomous robotics, particularly the robots that may be operating in domestic or healthcare situations. Safe robot behavior is clearly essential but not sufficient. Smart autonomous robots should be more than safe; they should also be transparent, at least where ethical reasoning is concerned-able to both choose and justify [2] actions that relate to human values. Following Moor [5] , our focus in this paper is on explicit ethical agents, in which ethics are represented explicitly and actions chosen on the basis of those ethics. As the cognitive, perceptual, and motor capabilities of robots expand, they will be expected to have an improved capacity for moral judgment.
2 By transparent, we mean that ethical machine reasoning should be accountable and accessible, such that human scrutiny of such decision processes is possible [6] . Making ethical machine reasoning scrutible in this way enables exposition of the reasoning behind actions taken and facilitates trust in such systems. It is clear through international efforts, such as the developing IEEE P7001 standard on Transparency in Autonomous Systems, that this view is becoming mainstream. We are used to the idea of safety-critical systems, and such systems require high standards of validationpreferably formal verification. Clearly, since safety is one of the ethical principles 3 relevant to the robotic systems, these will also require high standards of validation. More generally, since ethical principles are fundamental to the way a society judges both itself and others, we would argue that ethically critical systems (systems that have the capacity to impact adversely any ethical value considered important by the community it is created for) should, in general, be held to high standards of validation, just as the safety-critical systems are. Therefore, ethical machine reasoning should be verifiable [7] . Initial approaches to the implementation of ethical machine reasoning have focused on the idea of an ethical layer that can veto actions suggested by the underlying system [8] . However, as was notably observed in Asimov's construction of his Three Laws of Robotics [9] , ethical reasoning cannot simply be reactive (it is insufficient to state simply that a robot may not harm a human) but must also be proactive ("a robot should not, through inaction, allow a human to come to harm"). We suggest that in order to make proper ethical judgments, any ethical reasoning component should be capable of generating and evaluating ethically proactive actions, not just evaluating those proposed by some underlying goal-directed system. We, therefore, obtain three key desirable properties for ethical machine reasoning for robotic systems.
1) It should be proactive and able to initiate action where inaction risks violating ethical principles.
2) It should be transparent, in order to allow direct inspection of its reasoning by stakeholders and, potentially, also allow human-understandable explanations of its reasoning. 3) It should be possible to verify that it respects the values it reasons about, particularly (though not exclusively) where safety is concerned. Clearly, ethical machine reasoning is possible without adhering to these properties. However, we argue that adherence improves the utility for an ethical machine operating in the real world. Moreover, while transparency and verifiability are of benefits to most computational systems, (including robot controllers in general), we argue that they are of particular importance in ethically critical systems, where the dual importance of both respecting human ethical values and being seen to do so is key to acceptance.
To demonstrate the practicality and utility of our proposed key properties, we have devised an extension of the ethical layer in the architecture proposed in [10] . The extension that we have proposed consists of two main components. First is the addition of a proactive Planner Module to produce ethically proactive plans as required. Second is the addition of an "ethical black-box" (EBB) recorder module that logs the operation of the ethical layer and allows for the post hoc scrutiny of ethical decisions. As the ethically critical component of our proposed architecture, it is the ethical layer, in which our desirable properties are implemented.
To better illustrate the architecture, we detail an implementation following the proposed model. To do so, we have developed a Python library for belief-desireintention (BDI)-style agent reasoning called BDIPython. BDIPythonallows us to explicitly express the ethical layer's Ethical Decision Module using logical rules. Doing so facilitates the transparency of the reasoning in the ethical layer. In this implementation, we have used Asimov's Laws of Robotics as our code of ethics, chosen not because they represent a viable code of machine ethics but because they are a well-known and straightforward set of ethical rules that can be used to illustrate our approach.
To demonstrate that our implementation fulfills the desired verifiable property, we detail a means of formal verification of the ethical decision module. We have linked BDIPython directly to the Agent JavaPathfinder (AJPF) model checker by implementing a parser for the BDIPython code into a Java data structure that is used to generate a model. We can then verify that the BDIPython ethical decision module respects some given ethical system using an established methodology for the formal verification of autonomous systems supported by AJPF [11] .
Finally, we have validated our approach experimentally using a simple case study with real robots. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate that our implementation is capable of making demonstrably correct ethical decisions, and the reasoning process is transparent to human scrutiny. We then verify that this system obeys Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics.
II. B A C K G R O U N D
In this section, we elaborate upon the background motivation and design principles of the components comprising the proposed architecture and implementation thereof. Each section that follows relates to a particular element of the work presented in this paper. First, we consider the motivation behind ethical reasoning in robots; second, the simulation-based approach to robot anticipation, and how this can provide a robot with the capability to reason about ethical consequences; third, we detail the case for an EBB recorder; fourth, we describe the BDI paradigm, and why it is suitable for implementation of transparent ethical reasoning; and finally, we discuss formal verification, and how we can apply such a methodology to our BDI ethical reasoning.
A. Ethical Robots
As robots are increasingly expected to operate in environments within which their actions have moral or ethical implications, especially those with other agents, they require the capability to reason about these implications. Indeed, the need for robots equipped with ethical reasoning capabilities has been recognized in much recent work (e.g., [5] , [8] , [12] - [14] ). Studies have shown that people expect ethical decision making from robots, holding them to moral standards according to their appearance [15] .
In order for a robot to reason about ethics, it requires inter alia, a set of ethical rules. How these rules should be selected is, in general, an open problem, and various authors have suggested multiple approaches (see [16] for a review). Two paradigms of human ethical reasoning underlie the main approaches to machine ethics thus far suggested: consequentialist and deontological [16] . The central premise of consequentialist ethics is that actions should be evaluated on the basis of their consequences. Asimov's laws of robotics [9] are a well-known set of rules for governing machine ethics. However, their suitability has been justifiably questioned for a range of reasons, including the lack of any mechanism for resolving ethical dilemmas caused by intralaw conflicts, e.g., if two humans are in danger and only one can be saved [2] . Deontological ethics, on the other hand, is concerned with evaluating the motivation behind actions, i.e., does the intended purpose of the selected action abide by a given code of ethics. However, such an ethical paradigm has difficulties for artificial morality since it requires the correct attribution of mind states to artificial agents [16] .
Allen et al. [16] defined two clear approaches to implementing machine ethics for either ethical paradigm: topdown, whereby ethical decisions are incorporated into a robot's control architecture, or bottom-up, where a learning system is used to emulate ethically acceptable behavior without necessarily understanding the underlying ethics adhered to. Here, we consider the top-down approach because of its suitability both for verification and human scrutability.
B. Anticipation in Robotics (for Proactive Ethics)
In order for a robot to reason about ethics to be based on consequentialism, it is necessary for it to be able to anticipate the outcomes of its actions. More generally, for a robot designed to operate in the highly dynamic environment of the real world, the ability to "anticipate" future events is a major advantage. Such predictions can allow a system to make decisions in a way that combines past, present, and future events, so it is better equipped to react appropriately to unconstrained environments [17] . We follow Rosen's definition of an anticipatory system as "[. . . ] a system containing a predictive model of itself and/or of its environment, which allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the model's predictions pertaining to a later instant" [18] .
The conventional use of internal models, in which a system is mathematically modeled, is encompassed within Rosen's definition. However, even though such approaches have been extended to cover well-defined uncertainties and nonlinear plant [19] , their anticipatory capabilities are limited. Typically, the external environment is not explicitly modeled beyond a priori defined exogenous disturbances to the system model.
A newer and more powerful way in which a robot can be equipped with the cognitive machinery to enable anticipation is through an embedded simulation of the robot, its environment, and agents therein [20] . A robot, so equipped, has the potential to generate and test whatif hypotheses: what if I carry out action x?; of several possible actions xi which should I choose? One aim of such hypothesis testing is to enable assessment of the consequences of proposed actions without needing to commit to carrying out those actions [21] . That is to say, alternative sequences of motor actions are evaluated to find the sequence that best achieves the goal, before executing the best sequence. Identification of the best actions typically requires sufficient environment simulation to establish action context.
Arguably, these simulation-based internal models of others are a step in the direction of an artificial theory of mind [22] , i.e., the ability to form a predictive model of others [23] ; indeed, one of the several theories of mind is the simulation theory of mind [24] .
Here, we utilize simulation-based hypothesis testing as a fundamental component of our architecture. We do so to enable the ethical layer in our robot controller to assess the ethical consequences of potential behaviors; thus, it can select the most ethically appropriate. Central to the simulation, we use are the assumptions of how the human being modeled (in the robot's environment) will act-as a crude form of theory of mind.
C. Ethical Black-Box Recorder (for Transparency)
In line with the expectations of ethical decision making, there is also a requirement that such an ethical robot's control processes are transparent and understandable. There are a number of reasons for this: it enables trust if stakeholders can understand a robot's reasons and validate for themselves that those reasons align with their ethics; in accident investigation scenarios, transparency helps in diagnosing the causes of error and in their subsequent correction [25] . Winfield and Jirotka [25] argue for a robot equivalent of the flight data recorder or black-box installed in aircraft to facilitate this. By recording sensor data, and the control processes that acted on this data, post hoc scrutiny of robot behavior becomes possible. While some modern vehicles with partial autonomy have a data recording device, companies have thus far constrained access to this data to their own experts. We suggest that to be of real value, this data need to be open to outside scrutiny, outweighing any liability fears. To this end, we incorporate a data logging module into our proposed ethical layer. Following the proposal in [25] , it records the information needed for human scrutiny of the ethical decision process followed.
D. Belief-Desire-Intention Programming (for Transparent Ethics)
However, we argue that records of sensor data and control processes are insufficient by themselves. For the key parts of ethical reasoning, it must be possible for a human to understand how a deduction was generated from sensor data. More importantly, this process of deduction needs to be explainable in a way that is similar to the way humans justify their own actions. At present, it is often challenging to extract such explanations from utility functions in general and virtually impossible with opaque control techniques, such as artificial neural networks. We, therefore, argue that ethical reasoning should be represented in a declarative fashion as typified, for example, by the logic programming paradigm-for this, we turn to ideas from the field of rational agents.
At its most general, an agent is an abstract concept that represents an autonomous computational entity that makes its own decisions [26] . A general agent is thus simply the encapsulation of some distributed computational component within a larger system. However, in settings, such as ours, it is increasingly important for the agent to have explicit reasons (that it could explain, if necessary) for making one choice over another.
BDI agent programming languages provide this capability. They are based on the concept of rational agency [27] - [30] and draw heavily from the logic programming paradigm. Crucially, BDI agents make decisions based on intuitive concepts of how an agent's beliefs and desires lead to particular choices. These intuitive concepts were first elaborated by Bratman [27] and gave rise to a selection of BDI logics that were subsequently operationalized as BDI programming languages. In the BDI programming paradigm, beliefs represent the agent's (possibly incorrect) information about its environment, desires represent the agent's long-term goals, while intentions represent the goals that the agent is actively pursuing.
There are many different agent programming languages and agent platforms based, at least in part, on the BDI approach (e.g., AgentSpeak [31] , Jason [32] , 3APL [33] , Jadex [34] , Brahms [35] , GOAL [36] , and GWENDOLEN [37] ). Agents programmed in these languages commonly contain a set of beliefs, a set of goals (representing desires and usually forming part of intentions), and a set of rules. Rules determine how an agent acts based on its beliefs and goals.
In general, a rule is selected based on the beliefs and goals of the agent and transforms the goal (desire) into an intention, which is some executable structure that is supposed to achieve the goal. As a result of executing a rule/intention, the agent may perform actions and its beliefs and goals may change, often as a result of the actions. Crucially, the reasoning that is performed over beliefs and goals is based on logic programming and is often explicitly expressed in Prolog. This makes it possible to understand the choice of rules (and by extension actions), as deduction in first-order predicate logic and to explain such choices in these terms.
At the core of most BDI programming languages lies a reasoning cycle. The details vary from language to language, but the key aspects are polling an external environment for new perceptions represented as beliefs, reasoning over beliefs and goals to select appropriate rules, and executing rules to perform actions or manipulate beliefs and goals. In general, the execution of actions causes some effect in the external environment. This external environment may be a software artifact or a software that mediates between the agent and the real world. The explicit assumption of interaction with an external environment makes BDI programs particularly suitable for embedding as reasoning components in larger systems. Thus, as we desire the reasoning executed by our ethical layer to be human comprehensible, we implement the reasoning part of the ethical layer using BDI programming. To facilitate the integration of a BDI component within the ethical layer as a whole, we have developed a Python BDI implementation.
E. Verification of Agent-Based Autonomous Systems (for Verifiable Ethics)
In addition to the human scrutability, we also desire that the ethical reasoning be verifiable, i.e., it can be proven to abide by a given code of ethics: a property to which a BDI implementation lends itself well. The approach used for formal verification is dependent on the control architecture. Hybrid control architectures, such as ours, comprising discrete and continuous parts are becoming increasingly popular in the construction of autonomous systems. A typical hybrid system architecture is shown in Fig. 1 . The discrete part is often represented by a rational agent taking the high-level decisions, providing explanations of its choices, and invoking lower level continuous procedures [38] .
Formal verification is essentially the process of assessing whether a specification given in formal logic is satisfied on a particular formal description of the system in question. For a specific logical property, ϕ, there are many different approaches to this [39] - [41] , ranging from deductive verification against a logical description of the system ψS (i.e., ψS ⇒ ϕ) to the algorithmic verification of the property against a model of the system, M (i.e., M |= ϕ). The latter has been extremely successful in computer science and artificial intelligence, primarily through the model checking approach [42] . This takes a model of the system in question, defining all the model's possible executions, and then checks a logical property against this model (and, hence, against all possible executions).
In a hybrid autonomous system, the continuous control and the higher order decision-making components can (ideally) be cleanly separated. The lower level procedures generally also appear in nonautonomous systems and well understood techniques for their validation exist. One approach, therefore, is to focus the formal verification efforts on the decisions the rational agent makes, given the beliefs and goals it has [7] , [43] . In any system that interacts with a highly unpredictable real world, we cannot show that an agent always does the right thing, but we can show that its actions are taken for the right reasons.
This approach has been adopted as methodology by a range of works, considering applications in autonomous aircraft, spacecraft, and road vehicles [11] , [43] - [45] , in which a rational agent is verified using model checking to assess all its potential decisions. This methodology clearly adapts well if we can implement the ethical decision module component of our supervisory ethical layer as a BDI agent, allowing us to verify that such a system always chooses options that align with a given code of ethics based on the information that it has.
III. S I M U L AT I O N-B A S E D E T H I C A L R E A S O N I N G L A Y E R F O R R O B O T C O N T R O L A R C H I T E C T U R E S
Though robot controller architectures are many and varied (see [46] for a review), most can be considered to fit a three-layered model paradigm [46] , given the hierarchical organization of behaviors being controlled [47] . The layers in such a hierarchy are characterized by the degree of abstraction and temporal granularity at which they operate. The highest level control layer generates overall goals to be achieved (e.g., retrieve the beer from the fridge). At the next control layer, the goals are broken down into a series of tasks that make up the goal (e.g., move to fridge, open door). At the lowest level, tasks are broken down into motor actions that the robot must execute (e.g., move forward, raise arm).
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Although this generalization of robot controllers ignores the defining features of individual architectures, it serves as a useful framing mechanism for the addition of ethical decisions via a specialized fourth layer. Arkin et al. [8] and Arkin [48] proposed that the purpose of an ethical layer is to moderate the outputs of the other layers by evaluating them against a set of ethical criteria. Ensuring ethical behavior through a separate layer has a number of advantages. One key advantage is that the functionality can be verified independently of the rest of the robot controller [45] .
However, an ethical layer that acts only as a moderator can only evaluate behaviors that are proposed as part of the normal controller's operation. As discussed earlier, acting ethically might also involve being proactive, i.e., choosing a new action specifically to adhere to the ethical principles. An example of such proactive behavior is acting to prevent a human from coming to harm even if it might put the robot in danger (as per Asimov's laws).
A previous approach to addressing this issue was to have the controller suggest all possible tasks as behavioral alternatives, not just those relating to system goals [10] . However, the possibility of modifying a controller to suggest alternatives in the whole behavior space relies on there being a practicable number of behavioral alternatives. In [10] , this approach was possible due to a highly constrained experimental setting where the environment could be discretized into a grid, and each grid square was considered as a possible behavioral choice. It seems reasonable to assume that in most settings, this will not be possible (due to challenges in defining suitable discretization and computational cost of evaluating a large number of behaviors). Moreover, modifying the core robot controller in this way eschews the benefit of a separate layer as an independently testable system. By having the ethical layer generate behaviors, it can do so in a more constrained manner, given the ethical principles being utilized. Furthermore, it only needs to do so when the behaviors suggested by the other control layers do not satisfy those ethical principles. To this end, we describe here an ethical layer that not only evaluates the options suggested by the other control layers but also generates and evaluates the behavioral alternatives. These behavioral alternatives are generated as a consequence of ethical issues that it anticipates will occur if only the behaviors suggested by the other layers are considered.
Where the ethical layer sits in the layer structure (and, hence, what we mean by behavioral alternatives) is dependent on the level of abstraction used at each layer and, hence, whether the outputs from a given layer can be considered for their adherence to the adopted code of ethics. Here, we suggest that it sits between the task and action layers as this is the level of abstraction that best fits our adopted code of ethics. Thus, tasks proposed by the task layer need to be tested before they are used to generate action sequences. The ethical layer takes as input the tasks that the task layer suggests and outputs the most ethically appropriate task to the action layer.
The ethical layer detailed here consists of four modules: a Simulation Module to predict the outcome of tasks; a planner module to generate alternative tasks if those proposed by the task layer have ethical issues; an ethical decision module to compare the simulated actions and select the most ethically appropriate using declarative BDI reasoning, and an EBB data logging module to record the situations encountered and decisions made. Data flow and module integration are shown in Fig. 2 and detailed in its caption. This is an extended version of the architecture proposed in [49] , with a more sophisticated and transparently ethical decision process.
In order to prove the principles of operation for the control architecture and verification process, and to provide a clearer system description, we consider here a simple demonstration use case. In this case, a second robot is used as a proxy human (H-robot), operating with the ethical robot (E-robot) in a sparsely featured environment containing a few objects that can be defined as safe or dangerous (dependent on experimental settings; see Fig. 4 ). This demonstration use case will be elaborated upon in the module descriptions and in Section V. In this context, if the proxy human is predicted to move toward a dangerous location, the planner module will suggest points at which the robot can intercept the human path as potential tasks to be evaluated.
In the demonstration use case, we have treated Asimov's laws of robotics [9] as a test code of ethics, despite their obvious shortcomings, noted earlier and in [2] and [50] .
There is currently no agreement on the code of ethics that a robot should adhere to, even in simple scenarios [2] . However, we require ethical rules against which a robot's behavior can be evaluated and, hence, demonstrate our architecture. In the context of the current paper, therefore, we choose to make use of Asimov's laws to demonstrate the efficacy of our approach to proactive, transparent, and verifiably ethical robots without assigning any particular status to these laws.
Asimov's laws of robotics [9] are the earliest and the best known set of ethical rules proposed for governing the robot's behavior. Despite originating in a work of fiction, Asimov's laws explicitly govern the behavior of robots and their interaction with humans. This contrasts with more traditional consequentialist ethical frameworks that would need adapting to this purpose. The laws are simply described as follows.
1) A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. 2) A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 3) A robot must protect its existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. We have supplemented Asimov's laws with additional rules that relate to the likely success of an intercept plan. These are given a lower priority than the third law, so will only influence behavior if no other law is violated. 4a) If the human is far from danger, prioritize the waiting time at the intercept point. 4b) If the human is close to danger, prioritize the shorter robot walking distance. The rationale behind 4a is that the longer the wait time for the robot after arriving at the intercept location before the human arrives, the more robust the system is to errors in the predicted paths and travel times. The rationale behind 4b is that walking incurs some risk of falling over. This risk increases the further the robot walks, so a shorter walking distance increases the chance of achieving the robot's goal.
A. Simulation Module
The simulation module predicts the outcomes of behavioral alternatives. In order to do so, it needs to be equipped with the following: 1) a model of the robot controller; 2) a domain specific model of the human; 3) a model of the world; 4) a set of metrics against which the simulated plans are measured. As stated in [49] , the models need only be of sufficient fidelity to handle the domain in which the robot is to operate. In the demonstration case presented here, a low fidelity simulation, modeling the motions of agents as ballistic trajectories, is adequate to prove the principles of operation.
In order to simulate its own behavior, the ethical robot uses following three basic assumptions.
1) The robot uses a path planning algorithm that navigates the shortest path to its goal. 2) The robot has collision avoidance, so it plans a path to avoid known obstacles and stops when 0.5 m or closer to the human or a dangerous obstacle. 3) Valid goal locations are objects in the environment. It is also important to note that the behavioral alternatives consist of target locations in the arena to be moved to.
In order to simulate the behavior of the human, the robot's model also incorporates the following four basic assumptions.
1) The human walks in a straight line to its goal.
2) The human goal is always an object in the environment. From these two assumptions, the human goal can be inferred by projecting a line in its direction of travel, and the closest object to that line is assumed to be the goal.
3) The human is unaware of which objects are dangerous.
4)
The human has collision avoidance, so it plans a path to avoid the known obstacles and stops when 0.5 m or closer to the robot. The world model in this demonstration case consists only of static objects, designated as safe or dangerous (see Fig. 4 ).
Using the goal estimated for the human robot, and the ethical robot's goal as suggested for a particular behavioral alternative, paths are simulated for both agents. We also simulate the obstacle avoidance process running on both agents. Hence, if the paths of the two agents would come within 0.5 m of one another, they will stop.
The simulated paths are scored on a set of performance metrics that will be used in the ethical decision module to evaluate the plans. The set of metrics chosen reflects the characteristics of a given simulation-some metrics will reflect goal utility and others ethical implications. These metrics are not combined into an overall utility function but passed to the ethical decision module, where they are reasoned about declaratively (see Section III-C). The precise set of metrics chosen is both domain and ethical criteria specific, but the set used here demonstrates the basis upon which they should be selected.
1) H-Robot Distance to Danger:
Danger to the human can be considered to increase the closer it gets to a dangerous object.
2) E-Robot Distance to Danger:
Danger to the robot can be considered to increase the closer it gets to a dangerous object. 3) E-Robot Distance to Objective: Here, the robot objective is to get to a designated object in the environment; the closer it gets to this object, the better its goal can be considered achieved.
4) E-Robot Wait Time at Intercept Point: How long
before the human the robot arrives at the intercept point (used for law 4a).
5) E-Robot Walking Distance:
How far the robot walks (used for law 4b).
While the set described here is relatively simple, more complex metrics could be calculated if the context demands it. One caveat being that any metric added must produce a numerical output (however, it is calculated), such that plans can be compared using the declarative logic structures of the ethical decision module, resulting in a definitively best plan.
B. Planner Module
The planner module generates additional proactive behavioral alternatives and does so in such a way that they are likely to satisfy the ethical criteria. It is triggered if, after simulation and evaluation (by the other modules) of the behavioral alternatives suggested by the robot controller, the outcomes are deemed not to satisfy the ethical criteria by the ethical decision module.
In the current implementation, the plans are generated using a heuristic based on assumptions of the ethical issues that will be encountered and features specific to the use case, i.e., plans that are likely to keep the human and robot from danger and give a range of values for the other metrics being evaluated. We have chosen this approach to allow us to demonstrate the utility of the architecture as a whole. Clearly, it does not generalize well, requiring the existence of an appropriate heuristic. In Section VII, we suggest future work, in which the planner module could utilize probabilistic methods to intelligently sample the behavior space.
In the demonstration case presented here, if the H-robot is predicted to be heading toward danger (as evaluated by the ethical decision module), proactive tasks are generated and tested. Three task alternatives are generated as points on the projected path of the H-robot. They are selected as the earliest point along the path the E-robot is able to reach in time to intercept and, then, two equally spaced points further along the path. This simple heuristic is used as it is likely to produce behaviors, in which the E-robot intercepts the H-robot, preventing it from reaching danger. We choose a limited number of alternatives to improve the responsiveness of the E-robot and prevent the ethical decision module from introducing delays. Furthermore, considering a small number of alternatives matches with models of human cognition for similar processes [51] , from which our architecture draws inspiration [49] .
C. Ethical Decision Module
In order to select a behavioral alternative, the ethical decision module utilizes the simulation metrics (reported by the simulation module) to assess each task against a set of ethical rules. In our previous work describing a related architecture [49] , simulation metrics were collated using a mathematical function to give a single numerical value for each alternative to allow comparison. Although this has advantages in terms of computational efficiency and performance tuning (through parameters in the function), it presents difficulties in terms of both human understanding and formal verification of the decision process. This is particularly problematic if model checking is the chosen verification method since this requires a finite search space and arbitrary numerical values tend to introduce infinite (or at least very large) search spaces. To overcome these two issues, our ethical decision module makes use of declarative logic-based reasoning as typified by the BDI agents.
An obstacle here is that current BDI programming languages are not widely known and represent a style of programming unfamiliar to those in robotics. Furthermore, the need to use one programming language for decision making and a different one for the underlying control and, then, integrate these programs together on a robotic platform increases, rather than decreases the potential for errors. We have opted, therefore, to integrate the BDI style reasoning into Python as a library, BDIPython. (Python is widely used for robotics coding.) BDIPython has been designed as a generic module that could be used in many settings and can be considered as simply the tool by which we enabled the verifiable BDI reasoning in our ethical decision module. However, since it has not been described elsewhere, we will digress briefly into an outline of its key features.
In BDIPython, a BDI agent is a Python object, and its reasoning cycle can be started and stopped as the program so desires. This agent object then interacts with the rest of the Python program that can be viewed as its environment.
BDIPython maps BDI concepts to the Python constructs.
1) Beliefs:
We implemented a data structure for an agent's beliefs, referred to as the belief base in BDI programming, using a Python dictionary. The belief base represents a set of ground first-order predicates for the purposes of logical reasoning 5 and will be treated as such in what follows. We briefly outline some implementation details in Section II in the Supplementary Material. 2) Goals: There are also stored in a Python dictionary.
We did not use goals in this case study 6 and so will not discuss them in any further detail. 3) Rules: It consists of two Python functions, one of which represents a logical guard that determines whether the rule is applicable by inspection of the agent's belief and goal bases. This guard function may return values, representing the instantiation of variables in queries, that can be passed as parameters to the second function, the rule body. The rule body is executed if the rule is applicable. When more than one rule is applicable, the system simply selects the first in the list of rules-as is standard in many logic programming languages. Rule guards and bodies may contain arbitrary Python code, but BDIPython supplies several support functions to assist their construction, in particular the functions for inspecting the belief and goal dictionaries and composing the results using propositional logic connectives, such as AND and OR.
It also provides the functions for adding and removing the beliefs and goals from within rule bodies.
The reasoning cycle for a BDIPython agent first updates its belief dictionary (in an application specific fashion) typically as a response to sensor inputs; then, it manages its goals (checking and removing any that have been achieved); and finally, it selects a rule and executes it. This reasoning cycle is shown in Fig. 3 .
BDIPython is best suited for rules whose guards can be expressed as propositional logic formulas over the agent's beliefs and goals and, thus, as functions that simply return true or false. However, limited support is provided for richer reasoning in guards. In particular, it is possible to construct a rule that selects the best option from among several beliefs, based upon a comparison function defined by the programmer, and passes this option as a parameter to the rule body. If the comparison function does not define an antisymmetric transitive relation (for instance, the relation it defines represents a cyclic graph), so no "best" option can be identified, then the rule is considered inapplicable (i.e., its guard is considered to be false) and so not selected for execution. This requirement for antisymmetry and transitivity will turn out to be a key consideration when we discuss the verification.
We use BDIPython to implement two behaviors within the ethical decision module. First, the agent controls the triggering of the planner module. In the get percepts part of the reasoning cycle, the human distance to danger is checked for a set of robot controller task alternative simulations. If it is below a threshold for all of them, a belief that proactive tasks are needed is added to the belief base. This belief in turn is used as a guard for a rule that, when executed, signals the planner module. The mechanism is used as the planner module is a separate process, not part of the BDI agent; importantly, it allows logging of said process through the belief base and rule activation.
Second, we use the ability to select a best option to allow our ethical layer to select the most ethical of the tasks available to it and, then, transform the rule body into an intention to add the belief that this should be the current task. The action layer then executes the current task.
At the start of the process for selecting the most ethical task in accordance with Asimov's laws, the agent's belief base contains a number of beliefs about the existence of candidate tasks suggested either by the underlying robot control system or by the planner module. The tasks are labeled, t1, . . . , tn (one label for each task), and the belief task(ti) is in the agent's belief base for each of these labels.
We implement two comparison functions for comparing two tasks ti and tj . The underlying BDIPython implementation for selecting a best option ensures that all matching beliefs are compared to find the best (by iterating twice over the belief base), so we can use it to compare all tasks, ti, tj , such that task(ti) and task(tj) appear in the belief base.
These comparison functions used to implement Asimov's laws are designed to respect the order of precedence of said laws. This is accomplished using a series of if-thenelse statements that explicitly state this order. Two rules, one for each different comparison function, are used: the first for when the agent believes the human is close to danger and the second for when the agent believes the human is not close to danger (to represent the distinction between rules 4a and 4b discussed in Section III). This core set of rules and comparison functions form the primary component of the ethical decision module. As the ethical decision module implements the ethical rules, it is this component that needs to be verified.
We show mathematically the algorithm used by the ethical decision module in Box 1 and discuss it here. In Box 1, we use the following notation.
1) G ← RB is our syntax for a BDIPython rule where G is the guard (evaluated against the belief and goal bases) and RB is the rule body that is executed if the guard is true. We use quantification with this notation, e.g., ∃x.[G(x) ← RB(x)], to indicate when a parameter, x, is returned by the guard and passed to the rule body. 2) B(p) means that p is a predicate in the belief base of the agent. 3) add_belief(p) adds the predicate p to the belief base of the agent. The two rules are shown in (1) and (2). Both use BDIPython's support for picking a best option. In (1), the best task is chosen according to the comparison relation wd (where t1 wd t2 means t1 is preferable to t2 as t1 has a lower walking distance) in the situation where the agent believes danger_close. In (2), the best task is chosen according to the comparison function wt (the preferable task will have longer wait time between task completion and human interception) in the situation where the agent does not believe danger_close. Both rule bodies add a belief that the selected task is the "current task" (this belief is then consulted by the action layer when deciding which task to execute). 7 Note that use of an arrow symbol here is inherited from logic programming notation (and is commonly used in this context in the BDI languages) but does not imply a logical relationship between guard and rule body. The two comparison functions are very similar and are defined as relations in Definitions 1 and 2 (and implemented as nested if-then-else statements). These relations represent our modified version of Asimov's laws and use three other specially designed relations, ≺ hd , ≺ro, and ≺ rd , that compare the two tasks with respect to how close the human is to danger (≺ hd ), how close the robot is to its objective (≺ro), and how close the robot is to danger (≺ rd ). These are used in order of precedence, i.e., the two tasks are only compared with respect to ≺ro if they are indistinguishable in terms of how close the human is to danger. Finally, if there is no difference between the two tasks in terms of these three orders, then wd compares them using the valuations of the walking distance associated with each task v wd (t1) < v wd (t2), and wt compares them according to the waiting time associated with each task.
Our three relations pertaining to each individual law are implemented in the same way using ≺m (the relation between two tasks according to metric m) where m is one of hd, ro, or rd, and t1 ≺m t2 means t1 is preferable to t2 according to the metric m. In order to prevent small changes in sensor information having too great effect on robot behavior, we use a threshold, thm, for each metric so that if two tasks are both "good enough," e.g., in the outcome of neither task, the human ends up particularly close to the danger-then they are considered comparable, ≈m. Therefore, in the case of a metric to be minimized (e.g., the closeness of the robot to its goal), t1 is better than t2 if the value calculated for t1 on that metric, vm(t1), is below the threshold for the metric, and vm(t2) is above the threshold; t1 is also better than t2 if both vm(t1) and vm(t2) exceed the threshold and vm(t1) < vm(t2). This is formalized in Definitions 3 and 4.
We assume, in what follows, that tasks t1 and t2 have been generated in such a way that vm(t1) = vm(t2) for any metric. This means that ≺m is antisymmetric.
The ethical behavior of the robot is hence embedded not only in the BDI agent rules but also in the set of thresholds used to govern if and when a law might be violated. For example, a high threshold for robot danger distance could make the robot more prone to self-preservation, only considering the tasks that are incomparable on this metric if both placed the robot a long way from the dangerous area. It is important to note that how these values are labeled and used makes their impact transparent to human observation and interpretation.
Clearly, this approach to ethical decision making assumes that the chosen code of ethics used can be expressed in a similar way, i.e., with scorable metrics that can be used to compare the desirability of behavioral alternatives in a declarative fashion.
D. Ethical Black-Box Module
In line with the suggestion by Winfield and Jirotka [25] , we have a module that logs the outputs of the other modules. Specifically, it logs the following: 1) location data; 2) behavioral alternative parameters; 3) metrics for each alternative as scored by the evaluation module; 4) the reasoning process used in the ethical decision module: the belief base at each iteration, rule invocations, task selection decisions and reasoning, and the plan output to the robot controller. Each item of data is logged with a time stamp to allow recreation and analysis of a given moment. Further details of the data logged, particularly of the reasoning process, are given in Section V, as they relate to the BDI implementation explained in Section III-C.
IV. V E R I F I C AT I O N O F T H E E T H I C A L D E C I S I O N M O D U L E
We adopt the verification methodology from [11] , which describes the formal verification of rational agent components in autonomous systems. This uses model checking to demonstrate that the rational agent always tries to act in line with requirements and never deliberately chooses options that lead to bad states (e.g., ones the agent believes are unsafe). The agent's program is assessed to determine logical predicates that represent information coming in from the outside world. All possible combinations of these inputs are then explored via the model checker, allowing the verification to be agnostic about how the real world might actually behave; it simply verifies how the agent behaves no matter what information it receives.
In this context, model checking can be viewed as a kind of exhaustive testing. The BDIPython agent executes its reasoning cycle-at given moments in this cycle, the agent receives some information from the external program (that certain tasks are available, for instance, and the human is close to danger and that the walking distance is less for one task than for another) and, then, continues execution. When execution completes, or the agent reaches a state that has already been examined, the model checker backtracks to the last perception of interest and supplies a different set of information to the agent until the results of all possible sets have been explored. During this process, the model checker checks that certain properties hold (e.g., that the agent never selects a task that places the human in danger).
In order to apply model checking to our ethical decision module, we need to translate our BDIPython program, plus the semantics of the BDIPython reasoning cycle into the input language of a model checker.
The approach from [11] is implemented in the MCAPL framework [52] which provides access to model checking facilities to the programs written in a wide range of BDI-style agent programming languages as long as those languages have a Java-based program interpreter. The MCAPL framework has two main subcomponents: the AIL-toolkit [53] for implementing the interpreters for rational agent programming languages and the AJPFmodel checker that is an extension of the Java Pathfinder (JPF) model checker for Java programs [54] .
AJPF is a customization of JPF that is optimized for the AIL-based language interpreters. Agents implemented using the AIL-toolkit can thus be model checked in AJPF. It provides a property specification language to support reasoning about temporal properties of BDI programs and also provides support for implementing models of the agent's external environment in Java so that these models return combinations of the possible inputs to the agent. The AIL provides data structures for beliefs, intentions, goals, and so on, which are subsequently accessed by the model checker and on which the modalities of the property specification language are defined.
Thus, we must first implement an interpreter for the BDIPython reasoning cycle in the AIL. Second, a parser must be implemented from BDIPython programs into suitable Java data structures in order for the program to execute in this interpreter. Third, we must create an appropriate environment to model the rest of the Python program, and finally, our properties of interest must be expressed in the AJPF property specification language. Some of this work was independent of the specific application described here and can be reused in future applications-for instance, once the parser was implemented, it could be used for any BDIPython program not just ones expressing ethical decision making. Nevertheless, as when we introduced BDIPython, we briefly outline this paper here since it is not described elsewhere.
A. Verification of Python-Based Ethical Decision Module
We use the AIL-toolkit not to create an interpreter for a full programming language but to build a model of a BDIPython agent. Because BDIPython has an explicit reasoning cycle, we can model this easily within AIL, and then, AJPF can be used to simultaneously build and verify a model of the BDIPython agent. Much of the supporting and surrounding Python code is then treated as a part of the agent's environment in a black-box fashion.
The use of the MCAPL framework is not fundamental to our approach. We have adopted it because of its dual convenience as a framework for building verified models of BDI agents and for its support for the formal verification of autonomous systems controlled by rational agents. For full assurance of ethical decision modules of this kind, we would recommend the development of a program model checker for Python (that is, a model checker that operates directly on Python code, rather than on a model of some subsystem) or possibly a customization of AJPF to Jython [55] (the JVM Python interpreter).
In order to use the MCAPL framework to verify our ethical decision module, we need to use the AIL to build a Java data structure that represents the BDIPython agent and then execute this in our implementation of the BDIPython reasoning cycle in order to create a model of the engine's reasoning. This is a different challenge to the normal implementation of a BDI-language in the AIL. Python lacks the formal operational semantics that underpin most BDI languages (though semantics have been reverse engineered for large parts of the language [56] , [57] ), which, in turn, means that BDIPython lacks formal semantics. Hence, the system, as a whole, lacks the clear separation between BDI concepts and the "environment" (which is how we will need to treat the rest of the Python program) that is present in many BDI languages.
From the BDIPython code for an agent, we automatically construct a representation of the Python "agent" object using the data structures from the AIL-toolkit and, then, impose an operational semantics upon the ethical decision module based on the reasoning cycle shown in Fig. 3 . The AIL provides a data structure for agents that contain a belief base, a goal base, and a rule base. The belief and goal bases are the sets of ground first-order predicates. We translate the Python dictionaries representing the Python agent's belief and goal bases into a set of such predicates according to the semantics outlined in Section II in the Supplementary Material. AIL rule structures consist of a guard (evaluated against the agent's belief and goal base and potentially other structures if relevant) and a sequence of deeds that represent atomic actions (again represented as first-order predicates) in the environment or the addition or removal of beliefs and goals. We impose restrictions on the Python code that may appear in the functions defining guard and rule bodies in order to more easily construct these rule descriptions in Java.
We assume that a rule body contains only a sequence of atomic Python expressions (i.e., no control structures, such as "if" statements or "for" loops). Each of these atomic expressions is treated as an action in the environment unless it is add_belief or drop_belief from BDIPython, in which case it is treated as belief addition or removal. Where this function definition contains extra parameters, these are converted to variables wherever they occur in the body of the rule. Therefore, for instance, if param1 is a parameter of the rule definition and do_something_with(param1) appears in the rule body, then this will be converted into the predicate do_something_with(X), where X will be bound to the input variable at run time.
We require rule guards to be expressions built up from the library functions B (the agent believes), G (the agent has a goal) and the support provided for propositional logic: AND, OR, and NOT plus comparison functions (as used when the rule is to select the best option). With the exception of comparison functions, these can be converted to an AIL guard expression with the obvious semantics.
We restrict comparison functions, x y, to a sequence of nested if statements, each if with condition conditioni (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), such that the function returns true (i.e., x y) if the condition is satisfied. Thus, x y if conditioni(x, y) returns true for some i and x y otherwise). Each condition is a conjunction of (possibly negated) Python expressions (treated as functions on x and y that return true or false).
We add an additional phase into the reasoning cycle of agents in our AIL-model, in which Python calculations can take place and expect the verification environment to return the results of these calculations that the agent then stores in a special calculation base. This calculation base can be consulted when evaluating the guards on rules in the same way that the belief base is consulted. 
∧ ∀y = x.B(something(y) → x y) ← rb(x). (3)
The guard of this rule is essentially the expression on the left-hand side of the ← though it is transformed slightly for use in logic programming style reasoning. x y is expanded out to the expression condition1(x, y) ∨ . . . ∨ conditionn(x, y). Each expression conditioni(x, y) is expanded out in turn to a conjunction of (possibly negated) Python expressions. Therefore, for instance, if conditioni(x, y) were x ≺ hd y ∧ y ≺ hd x ∧ x ≺ro y, then each of x ≺ hd y, y ≺ hd , and x ≺ro y is treated as a Python expression, and the calculation base will be consulted for their value. If some x is found that satisfies the expression, then it will be passed to the rule body as a parameter.
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Therefore, our functions from Box 1 for comparing two tasks according to specific metrics ≺ hd , ≺ro, and ≺ rd as well as simple comparisons of walking distance and time using < and > become Python calculations under this process.
Once the translation of the Python code into an AIL agent data structure has been carried out, it can be executed using a reasoning cycle created for it using support for this provided by the AIL.
The agent data structure and executable reasoning cycle can be combined with an application specific implementation of an environment (i.e., one that can return all possible combinations of beliefs and calculations as required by the methodology that we are using). This enables AJPF to construct a model of all possible executions of the agent.
Once we have such a model, we can formally verify properties expressed in the AJPF property specification language. In general, constructing such properties is straightforward (the language has constructs that refer to the agent's beliefs, goals, and so on). Python calculations, however, represent a nonstandard part of our model, and so we treat these as percepts in the property specification language. Percepts are facts that are perceptible to some observer of the environment but not necessary believed by the agent.
Note (Beliefs versus Python Calculations):
The decision about what information should be stored as beliefs and what should be calculated on the fly by Python is in the hands of the programmer using BDIPython. Input from sensors should be stored as beliefs, but other information can often plausibly be treated either way. In the current system, the distinction makes little difference to the verification.
V. E X P E R I M E N TA L V A L I D AT I O N A N D F O R M A L V E R I F I C AT I O N
We have conducted a series of experiments in order to validate that our approach results in robot behavior that adheres to the ethical rules described in Section III and allows the system's reasoning to be transparently ethical, verifiable, and proactive.
To first establish that the system obeys Asimov's laws, we reconstructed the experiments previously carried out in [49] with our supplemental rules (laws 4a and 4b) disabled. We then duplicated the experiment that demonstrates human safety with those supplemental rules enabled to observe how they change the robot behavior while demonstrating that the robot still adheres to Asimov's laws. A summary of the aims of each experiment is shown in Table 1 . A secondary purpose of our experiments is to demonstrate the feasibility of an ethical black-box recorder as proposed in [25] . In particular, we aim to demonstrate that the suitability of our BDI-based approach for producing human scrutable logs through a highly transparent decision process. At each update iteration, we record the belief base, the rule executed, and-if a compare rule is executed-the comparison results used for behavior selection. In addition, logged is the data from the tracking system, the behavioral alternatives evaluated, and the scores in each evaluation metric. Each item of data is time-stamped to enable later reconstruction of all decisions made. This log data are then used to produce a description of the process that has been followed.
In addition to the validation experiments, we have also followed the previously described formal verification procedure for the ethical decision module. The BDI rules and comparison functions were extracted from the ethical decision module and parsed into data structures in the AIL. Properties expressing adherence to Asimov's laws were then verified using AJPF.
A. Experimental Setup
In these experiments, we use two NAO robots as the Hrobot and E-robot, as defined in Section III, i.e., a robot acting as a proxy for the human, and a robot controlled using our ethical architecture. All experiments were carried out in a 3 m × 2.5 m arena with two objects designated A and B on the opposite side of the arena from the start locations of the robots; the setup is shown in Fig. 4 . Object A was designated "dangerous," and B was designated as "safe." The robots are considered to have encountered danger if they get within 1 m of the dangerous object. To enable the robots to navigate, and the E-robot's controller to simulate the environment and both robots, a four-camera tracking system was used that, via reflective markers, tracks positions and orientations of the robots and objects (though the objects were static) at 30 Hz.
At the start of each trial, both H-and E-robots move to their designated start locations (see Fig. 4 ), and when both have arrived, the trial itself begins. Both H-and E-robots have predetermined objective positions (to move to) that are varied by experiment. Whether the E-robot's objective 
Both H-and E-robots use the tracking information to simulate low-level collision detection that would cause them to stop if within 0.5 m of each other or an object. The E-robot assumes that the H-robot does not know if a location is dangerous. The E-robot controller can restart its motion if the H-robot is observed to be stationary-it treats a stationary human as an obstacle to be avoided.
As the H-robot has no ethical layer, it simply moves to its predetermined objective unless proximity to the E-robot causes it to stop. The ethical layer in the E-robot operates at about 1 Hz, 11 reevaluating a set of plans, selecting the most ethical course of action, and determining the goal of the E-robot. The E-robot's control layer suggests A and B as possible goals for evaluation, supplemented if required by the planner module in its ethical layer. The walking speed of the H-robot robot is set to be lower than the speed of the E-robot. The difference in speed gives the E-robot a larger range for intercepting the H-robot. The speeds of the H-and E-robots were approximately 0.02 and 0.04 ms −1 , respectively. These speeds were not varied during the experiment.
B. Experiment Settings and Results
All results reported below are obtained with no changes to the controllers of the H-and E-robots. The E-robot danger distance threshold and H-robot danger distance thresholds are set to 1.5 m; this allows for some errors in E-robot simulations while still keeping the H-robot safe. The E-robot objective distance threshold is set to 0.5 m, the distance needed to consider the objective reached. The different experimental conditions are set by the goals of the robots, and whether or not the E-robot goal is commanded by the H-robot. Each experiment is a single demonstration trial (representative of multiple trials conducted with the same settings) to facilitate clear discussion of the data logs recorded in the EBB. For each experiment, the decision processes are obtained directly from those logs.
1) Self-Preservation:
The aim of this experiment is to demonstrate the adherence to Law 3, i.e., that the E-robot acts to keep itself safe if (and only if) this does not conflict with obedience (Law 2) or human safety (Law 1). For this experiment, the H-robot remains stationary at its start location, the E-robot objective is A, and it is not H-robot commanded.
There is no inferred goal as the H-robot is stationary, so the H-robot is believed to be safe. There is no H-robot command, and of the two behavioral alternatives, moving to location A or to location B, A is considered dangerous to the E-robot (i.e., danger distance is below the threshold), while B is not. Hence, the E-robot moves to location B (see Fig. 5 ).
11 Empirically determined to provide sufficiently reactive planning, without overburdening the NAO controller with control requests. 2) Obedience: The aim of this experiment is to demonstrate that adherence to Law 2 overrides Law 3, i.e., the E-robot will walk toward danger if commanded by the H-robot. This experiment only differs from the previous one, in which the robot's objective is now H-robot commanded.
There is no inferred goal as the H-robot is stationary, so the H-robot is believed to be safe. There is belief in an H-robot command, so for the two behavioral alternatives, locations A and B, B is above the distance to E-robot objective threshold, while A is below the threshold. The values for robot distance to danger are not compared due to Law 2 having priority. Hence, we observe that the E-robot moves to location A even though it is dangerous to the robot (see Fig. 6 ).
3) Save Human: The aim of this experiment is to demonstrate that adherence to Law 1 overrides Law 3, i.e., the E-robot will act to prevent the H-robot from coming to harm even if doing so is dangerous for itself. For this experiment, the H-robot objective is A, the E-robot objective is B, and it is not H-robot commanded. The inferred goal for the H-robot is A, so the E-robot believes the H-robot is in imminent danger. Of the five behavioral alternatives, the objects A and B and intercept point i3 (see Fig. 7 ) allow the H-robot to come closer to danger than the allowed threshold. Hence, points i1 and i2 are considered more desirable than any of the others, and though it puts the E-robot closer to danger than the threshold, i1 is selected as it puts the robot further from danger than i2. The robot objective distance is not checked due to there being no belief in any H-robot command. Hence, we observe the E-robot moves to intercept the H-robot. Due to inaccuracies in simulated movement times, the intercept occurs with the E-robot approaching from the side. The precise target point shifts over time due to replanning compensating for inaccuracies in simulated potential intercept points and movement times. It is important to note that despite this reality gap, the intercept still occurs. After interception, the H-robot is no longer believed to be in danger, and the E-robot moves to its remaining goal B (see Fig. 7 ).
4) Save Human and Obey:
The aim of this experiment is to demonstrate that adherence to Law 1 overrides Law 2 and 3, i.e., the E-robot will act to prevent the H-robot from endangering itself even if doing so is dangerous for itself and also ignores a direct command. For this experiment, the H-robot objective is A, and the E-robot objective is also A, as commanded by the H-robot.
Initial behavior and beliefs are the same as in the previous experiment; the notable difference being that points i1-i3 are seen as being too far from the humancommanded objective, but this is overridden in the same way as the perceived danger to the E-robot. After interception, the H-robot is no longer believed to be in danger, and the E-robot obeys the human command in the same way as in the above-mentioned Obedience experiment (see Fig. 8 ).
5) Save Human With Supplementary Rules:
The aim of this experiment is to demonstrate the effect of one of our context-specific extension to Asimov's Laws, Law 4a, and hence, the flexibility of our approach while still maintaining verifiable and scrutable ethical decisions. This mainly differs from the above-mentioned Save Human experiment by the inclusion of the additional ethical rules. To do so, we extended the conditional rule set in the BDI logic to enable selection of the appropriate plan comparison function. In addition, to allow for the secondary rules to operate properly with our arena size, a robot is considered in danger if it is within 0.5 m of a dangerous object; this reduces the E-and H-robot danger thresholds to 1 m.
We observe that an intercept occurs at a point much closer to the danger than without the supplementary rules. In the initial plans, the H-robot is believed to be far from danger, and only the points i1 and i2 do not put the human or robot too close to danger; i2 is selected as it allows for a longer wait time than i1. However, it is important to note that the intercept occurs actually on the H-robot path, rather than from the side as in previous experiments; the waiting time allowed for, combined with frequent replanning, compensates for inaccuracies in simulated travel times, resulting in better interception (see Fig. 9 ).
C. Verification of Ethical Reasoning in Our Asimov-Based Proactive Ethical Decision Module
While we were able to experimentally validate the behavior of the robot in several specific examples, the link between BDIPython and the AJPF verification system allows us to provide deeper analysis of the ethical layer. We consider here the implemented ethical decision module associated with task selection when the human has specified an objective through a direct command. This is the engine shown in Box 1. This agent should believe that some task t is the current task if it conforms to our modified version of Asimov's laws, i.e., it is the best of all the tasks available, as described in Section III. The Python code for the ethical decision module is automatically converted to a Java data structure, as described in Section IV-A.
We also construct a verification environment for this agent. Verification environments are designed to generate random choices for inputs to the agent (in this case, beliefs put by the environment in the belief base and the possible results of Python calculations in comparison functions). The process of model checking then explores all possible combinations of these choices. Therefore, our verification environment may, at random, return danger_close as a belief. We considered cases where either two or three tasks are available: task1, task2, and task3. Therefore, the environment always returns task(task1) and task(task2) as beliefs in the case of two tasks and task(task1), task(task2), and task(task3) in the case of all three. Note that in our experimental setup, the ethical layer automatically generates three additional tasks for consideration when it deduces that the tasks suggested by the task layer result in the human moving too close to danger; hence, the threetask case is sufficient to verify this layer.
At the point where the agent requests the value of Python calculations, then the environment considers all possible results for the Python expressions appearing in the comparison functions. For instance, in the case of ≺ hd , it returns either task1 ≺ hd task2 or task2 ≺ hd task1 or neither (indicating that task1 ≈ hd task2). It similarly returns a choice for the comparison of task1 and task3 and for the comparison of task2 and task3. In the case of the movement and waiting times, we assume that these impose a strict order on tasks so that there are only two possible results. Model checking allows us to consider all possible combinations of the results of these beliefs and calculations and so verify that our ethical decision module makes the correct (most ethical) choice in each case.
Equations (4)-(6) describe three properties representing Asimov's laws in the AJPF property specification language. The AJPF property specification language uses standard linear temporal logic (LTL) operators: means "it is always the case that" and ♦ means "it is eventually the case that." LTL is extended with specific operators for BDI concepts, so B means that something is in the agent's belief base and P means that something is "perceptible"--in the case of our Python agent, we interpret this as meaning it is in the agent's calculation base (a full description of the AJPF property specification language, and its semantics can be found in [52] )
((B(current_plan(task1))
The three properties state that it is always the case that if task1 is believed to be the current task, then Python has calculated that task1 either does not place the human in significant danger or, if it does, then task2 places the human in greater danger (property (4)-corresponding to Asimov's first law); it is always the case that if task1 is believed to be the current task and the Python calculates that it places the robot further away from its (human specified) objective than task2, then Python has calculated that task2 places the human in more danger than task1 [property (5)-corresponding to Asimov's second law]; and finally, that if task1 is believed to be the current task and Python calculates that it places the robot in more danger than task2, then either task2 places the robot much further from its objective than task1 or it results in the human being in much closer to danger than task1 (property (6)-corresponding to Asimov's third law). Similar properties can be constructed to compare task1, task3, and so on.
The results of verifying the three properties for the two plan cases on a four-core 3.4-GHz iMac with 8-GB memory running MacOS 10.13.1 are shown in Table 2 . We record the time taken for the verification and the number of states in the resulting model of ethical decision module execution created by the system.
Table 2 Results of Verification in the Two Plan Cases
We were unable to perform a similar verification in the three-task case because the combinatorial explosion involved caused the size of the model to become too large and we terminated the verification process after one week. We will discuss this further in Section VII.
As mentioned earlier, BDIPython's support for picking a best option selects no task in the case that the comparison function does not represent an antisymmetric transitive relation, and the corresponding guard expression in our AIL implementation naturally behaves the same way. Our verification environment generates many cases where this is not the case-it does not even guarantee that the subsidiary relations represented by ≺m are transitive. This meant that the attempt to prove property (7) (eventually, either task1, task2, or task3 is believed to be the current task), for instance, failed rapidly with a counterexample
This is a known issue with the so-called unconstrained environments. While they are agnostic about the behavior of the world and system beyond the BDI agent, and while they capture correct behavior for all possible inputs, they usually represent overgeneralizations of reality and flag up many false negatives. The solution to this is to create a constrained abstraction of the environment that embodies certain assumptions about the behavior of the real world.
We have modified our unconstrained environment with the following assumptions. This allowed us to verify (7) in approximately three days for the three-task case (thanks to the reduced search space) as well as properties (4)- (6) . The times taken for these verifications on a four-core 3.4-GHz iMac with 8-GB memory running MacOS 10.13.1 are shown in Table 3 . We note that there is no guarantee that assumptions made for constrained environments are correct. It may, however, be possible to validate them through other means-for instance, it is straightforward to prove that our comparison functions are antisymmetric and transitive, given some basic assumptions about the behavior of objects Table 3 Results of Verification in the Three Plan Cases in space; informal proofs are given in Section I in the Supplementary Material. A methodology has recently been developed to allow such assumptions to be checked using runtime verification [58] . In this methodology, a specification of the assumptions is created as a trace expression [59] which is then automatically converted into both the environment used by the AJPF model checker and a runtime monitor that operates when the system is deployed and can react if it detects that the environment is violating the assumptions used during verification (and so the system is now operating in an "unverified" state).
While the time taken to perform verification may seem slow. It is important to note that the work we did on the translation of BDIPython programs into the input for AJPF does not need to be repeated. Therefore, a programmer needs only to write a BDIPython program and supply a list of sensor inputs and Python calculations in order to automatically verify the properties of their programs. This has advantages over many other verification techniques that require programs to be transformed by hand into some modeling language and may also require manual intervention to guide the proof process.
VI. R E L AT E D W O R K
Here, we review three areas of research which relate to different elements of the work described in this paper. First, we discuss anticipation in robots, a core design principle of our architecture. The ability to model and predict ethical consequences is, we believe, a differentiating feature of our work. Second, we note the paucity of experimentally tested ethical robots and relate our contribution to previous work. Finally, we argue that we have advanced the field of machine ethics verification significantly beyond that which was undertaken previously.
A. Anticipation in Robots
Providing robots with the ability to anticipate the future through the use of simulation-based internal models integrated into their control architecture has, in recent years, been demonstrated by a number of researchers. For example, Vaughan and Zuluaga [60] show that selfsimulation of both a robot and its environment can be used to overcome the incomplete self-knowledge and enable navigation task planning. Similarly, Bongard et al. [61] describe a four-legged starfish-like robot that self simulates in order to learn its own morphology and how to control it, i.e., compensate for lack of self-knowledge (although without simulating the environment).
In addition to self-simulation and environment simulation, the simulation of other agents may also be required. Zagal et al. [62] use simulation in soccer robots to facilitate the adaptation of behaviors before they are deployed on the real robots, i.e., using the simulation to test how possible behaviors might actually operate in the environment with other robots.
The common methodology underlying the reported works on simulation-based anticipation is the principle of hypothesis generation and testing. This has been demonstrated to be a powerful approach to robot control with a variety of applications. However, these differ from the work that we have presented here in the purpose of hypothesis evaluation, i.e., previous work has focused on task performance that we supplement with evaluating ethical consequences. Furthermore, the robot simulates humans in the environment in addition to itself. Previous works have not simulated environments with human actors.
B. Ethical Robots
Machine ethics is a nascent field, consisting of only a few studies implementing ethics on actual robots. To the best of our knowledge, the efforts of Anderson and Anderson on the GENETH system [63], Bringsjord's Akratic Robot [64] , and our previous work [10] , [49] are the only instances of real robots equipped with (limited) moral principles.
GENETH has been developed over a number of years [2] , [65] and uses an approach based on evaluating the planned actions against a set of ethical constraints; however, as there was no simulator, only reactive ethical decisions were possible. GENETH uses inductive logic programming as a machine learning process with input from domain ethicists in order to determine its ethical principle. This principle is then represented in a fashion that allows transparent explanations to be provided for decisions (as we have recommended here). Among other things, this approach demonstrates that bottom-up approaches to defining an ethical system can be adopted without necessarily sacrificing transparency.
Bringsjord et al's [64] work builds on a program of developing a logic, the deontic cognitive event calculus, DCEC CL , in which various ethical theories can be expressed. The Akratic robot, for which a simple example has been implemented on a NAO robot, considers a scenario in which a robot charged with guarding a prisoner of war must choose between retaliating with violence to an attack (and satisfying a self-defense goal) or refraining from retaliation. It is referred to as Akratic from the Greek akrasia referring to when a person acts in contradiction to their better judgment. Bringsjord et al. [64] argue that the underlying robot architecture, into which modules for selfdefense and detainee management are embedded, must be capable of ethical reasoning in order to detect when such conflicts may arise and prevent them occurring (either by preventing the installation of conflicting modules or by overriding the goal-based reasoning when it conflicts with deontologically expressed obligations and prohibitions). This reflects our insistence that verification is an important aspect of implementing ethical reasoning though in the case of the Akratic robot, the approach is to embody ethical verification as a fundamental part of the robot's operating system.
In our previous work, we used a similar approach to that presented here using a simulator to evaluate what-if hypotheses. In contrast to the work presented here, ethical decisions were made through evaluation of an ethical desirability function. This resulted in significant challenges in modeling the system for verification [66] , and decisions were much less transparent with this approach.
In addition to these few implementations, there have been some additional studies examining machine ethics from either a theoretical (e.g., [12] , [67] ) or simulation standpoint (e.g., [8] ). All of these studies have used a similar approach, i.e., planned actions are assessed against a set of ethical constraints, with their ethical implications assumed from known features of the environment.
C. Verification of Ethical Machine Reasoning
Previous work on the verification of ethical machine reasoning has focused on the use of the AJPF system that we have used here. Work in [66] attempts to verify the system proposed in [10] upon which the work reported here is also based. In this verification, a new version of the system was produced in the AIL using two bespoke languages: one for the ethical consequence engine and another to represent action selection in the robot. The behavior of the system was verified in an environment consisting of a simple 5 × 5 grid. A number of discrepancies became apparent during this verification-for instance, the verification on the 5 × 5 grid was converted into a model for the Prism model checker [68] and gave very different probabilistic results to those derived by experiments. One lesson learned from this experience was that it is difficult to accurately extract models of ethical decision modules written in Python (and by assumption in other common procedural languages used for robotics), which are tightly embedded in larger programs in the same programming language. One of our key aims here was to strengthen the link between the code produced by the programmer of the ethical decision module and the model that was used in verification. This is achieved via the twofold approach of supplying a BDI library for Python, encouraging a cleaner separation of the ethical reasoning from the rest of the system and providing an automatic mechanism to extract code written using that library into a model in AJPF.
Work in [45] also uses AJPF to verify an ethical module operating as part of a larger system. It assumes that ethical reasoning is only invoked in special cases, i.e., that normal operation of the system is ethical by default. However, when some unexpected event occurs, AI techniques, such as planning or learning, are used to generate a new course of action. Transparent ethical reasoning can be used to choose between the options produced by the AI system based on a number of ethical principles and a context-dependent priority among those principles. The general approach is similar to that described here. However, an entirely hypothetical system written in a bespoke language is verified. We have verified an ethical decision module for an existing system written in a widely used language. Work in [45] does consider a context-dependent way for an ethical decision module to resolve conflicts among competing ethical principles, as opposed to the strict universal ordering we have considered here.
VII. F U R T H E R W O R K
Here, we have demonstrated that plans, selected according to a set of ethical rules, can be verified. Proactive plans are generated by a heuristic designed for the simple case study presented here. However, the utility of plans generated in this way is reliant on the design of the heuristic and, even in our simple demonstration case, is unlikely to represent the best possible solutions. Indeed, it is relatively easy to imagine scenarios, where heuristics of this form are nontrivial to design. Hence, we suggest that a better, more generalizable method for proactive plan generation would make the system applicable in a wider range of contexts. One possible method to overcome this in the future work is to use a machine learning technique, such as Baysian optimization of Gaussian processes [69] to better sample the plan space, balancing different ethical criteria metrics, hence generating the plans that are likely to be ethically desirable. One immediately apparent challenge for such an approach is defining how to combine metrics into an overall score (needed for the optimization process) reflective of how the ethical decision module does its reasoning.
In order to facilitate clear demonstration of the principles of operation of our ethical layer architecture (as well as the verifiable and scrutable reasoning of the BDI-based ethical decision module), our case study only required a simple simulation with limited models of the world and the proxy human. It is easy to envisage scenarios, closer to real world usage of an ethical robot, where a more complex simulation module would be required. One avenue of future work in this direction is to examine better modeling of the human decision process. A key part of such modeling would be some artificial theory of mind, reducing the dependence on overly simple assumptions of likely human actions.
JPF, which underpins AJPF, is specifically created to provide what is known as program model-checking capabilities for Java-bytecodes. In program model checking, the actual executable code of a system is verified as opposed to a model of the system. Program model checking is, in general, more resource intensive than the normal model checking and cannot handle large search spaces. By using AJPF to check BDIPython models, therefore, we are suffering from its inability to examine a large search space (hence, our inability to prove the system obeys Asimov's laws in an unconstrained environment with even three plans) without gaining the advantage of verifying the actual executable code of the system. There are a number of approaches to improving this situation, including implementing a custom model checker for Python, or executing BDIPython in Jython [55] , a Java-bytecode-based interpreter for Python.
Further development of BDIPython itself is also useful, in particular to increase support for predicate logic-like representations in guards that can pass instantiations of variables/parameters from guards to rule bodies (as in the case of add_pick_best_rule). We anticipate a need for both a selection of specialized functions (such as add_pick_best_rule) and a more general mechanism to allow arbitrary predicate logic expressions to instantiate parameters for execution.
VIII. C O N C L U S I O N
We have considered the question of how ethical reasoning should be implemented in a robot, assuming the popular architecture (see, for instance, [10] , [45] , [48] , [63] ) with a dedicated ethical reasoner. In particular, we have argued that such an ethical control layer should aim to be proactive, transparent, and verifiable. In order to achieve an ethical control layer with these properties, we have devised an architecture in which behavioral alternatives proposed by the underlying control system are evaluated using explicit declarative reasoning, in the form of a rational agent. If all options are deemed unsatisfactory, the ethical control layer has the ability to proactively generate new options and submit these to ethical reasoning.
The use of a rational agent to reason about the ethics of options allows the system's decisions to be explainable and transparent, by recording the agent's beliefs, calculations, and rule selections in an EBB data logger. The logical nature of the rational agent rules, then, allows a deductive argument to be reconstructed.
At the same time, the rational agent can be extracted into a model, and we can formally verify that its choices respect a specified code of ethics by exhaustive search over the choices it makes given particular beliefs and calculations.
We have implemented this technology in an experimental case study and shown that its ethical reasoning can be verified using a translation from the Python code into the AJPF model-checking system. Thus, we have developed and demonstrated, 12 what is believed to be, the first formally verified ethical robot.
A P P E N D I X O P E N D ATA S TAT E M E N T
The program code and experimental data discussed in this paper are available as follows.
1) The source code for BDIPython is available at https://github.com/VerifiableAutonomy/BDIPython, where it is currently under active development. The version discussed here is archived at http://dx.doi.org/10.17638/datacat.liverpool.ac.uk /667. 2) The source code for AJPF is available from http://mcapl.sourceforge.net, where the work in this paper can be found in the ethical_engine 12 In a simple laboratory test scenario.
branch of the git repository. The version discussed here is archived at http://datacat.liverpool.ac.uk/id/ eprint/667. 3) The Python code for the Ethical NAO Robot is available at https://github.com/VerifiableAutonomy/ EthicalNao, where the work in this paper can be found in the ethical_engine branch of the git repository. The version discussed here is archived at http://datacat.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/ 667.
4)
Experimental data generated by the case study are available from the University of the West of England's research repository http:// researchdata.uwe.ac.uk/375.
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